This paper empirically investigates the e¤ects of memberships in information and social networks on the demand for public goods. The data originate from a unique …eld experiment that took place during the …rst round of the 2001 presidential elections in Benin. Randomly selected villages were exposed to "purely" redistributive or "purely" national public goods electoral platforms, while the remaining villages were exposed to standard mixed platforms. We …nd that individuals who are exposed to media or who are members of local associations have higher demand for public goods, while voters who are more involved in political discussions demand less. Ceteris paribus, demand for public goods is higher among voters who have ethnic ties with a candidate, are more educated or female, but we …nd no modifying e¤ect of religion or socio-economic status.
Introduction
The role of information and civic community in economic performance has attracted a great deal of attention in the recent development debate. The empirical political agency literature has identi…ed public access to information as a key determinant of corruption levels and public goods provision in developing countries (See, for example, Reinikka and Svensson (2003) , Besley and Burgess(2002) ). The social capital literature, on the other hand, has investigated the role of trust and associational memberships on government performance and economic growth.
(See, for example, Olsen (1982) and Putnam (1993) ). However, both in the political agency literature and in the social capital literature, the evidence provided relies mostly on aggregate data rather than on individual data. In other words, although several empirical studies have uncovered the extent to which aggregate economic or political outcomes in a country, state or local community depend on the proportion of informed citizens or the degree of political participation, there is very little evidence on ways in which choices made by individual citizens are a¤ected by their membership in civic or political organizations, their involvement in informal political discussions groups or their use of media outlets. As indicated by Glaeser and al. (2002) , the absence of micro-evidence limits our ability to study the e¤ects of social networks on economic development. This paper investigates the relationship between memberships in information and social networks and the demand for public goods at the voter level. We measure memberships in information and social networks by surveying voters's use of media outlets as sources of information, their participation in associative life and political discussions, and their connections with the outside world through traveling, language skills and long-distance family relationships. These networks can be aggregated by their reach, i.e. into "broad" networks and "local" networks, or according to their nature, i.e. media use, involvement in political discussions, associational life, travel and language skills.
We measure a voter's demand for public goods by measuring how she changes her voting behavior when exposed to national public goods electoral platforms. A major challenge to the estimation of voters' reactions to di¤erent electoral platforms is that electoral platforms are consciously chosen by politicians according to voters'characteristics. Even when they follow a particular electoral program, when targeting particular audiences of voters, politicians choose messages they think will appeal to those voters. Hence the di¤erence between voting patterns among groups of voters is likely to re ‡ect both the electoral platforms used by the politician and the characteristics of the voters. A solution to this endogeneity problem is to randomly expose voters to particular messages and measure their voting response. The data used in this paper originate from a unique …eld experiment that took place in the context of the …rst round of the March 2001 presidential elections in Benin. Randomly selected villages were exposed to "purely" redistributive or clientelistic or "purely" national public goods platforms, while the remaining villages were exposed to the default mixed platforms. The experiment is unique in the sense that it involves real presidential candidates competing in real elections. This avoids the problems of external validity associated with laboratory experiments.
We con…rm the …nding in Wantchekon (2003) that voters do not favor public goods electoral platforms, as re ‡ected in their sanctioning candidates who use them. Wantchekon (2003) found that women are less negatively oriented to these platforms than are men. A study by Fafchamps and Gabre-Madhin (2001) argued that women are the driving forces behind regional commerce in Benin, so the question rises whether the association between gender and demand for public goods is an artifact of the social networks and trade contacts that women participate in. For example, women who travel more might value development of road and other infrastructure beyond the locality as an important policy issue. We …nd that individuals involved in broad social networks have higher demand or stronger preference for public goods. This is entirely driven by use of media, not by language skills or frequency of travel. As for the association between local social networks and public goods demand, we …nd that voters who are more involved in political discussions demand less national public goods while those who are members of local associations demand more. We …nd that, while these networking and information indicators explain a signi…cant amount of voter response, they do not drive the di¤erential responses between men and women, with women still more responsive to public goods platforms. We …nd that certain voter characteristics increase the demand for public goods: ethnic a¢ liates of a candidate respond more positively to a public goods electoral platform, as are more educated voters.
The paper contributes to the literature on social capital and economic development. Putnam (1993) contends that the relative economic prosperity and government e¢ ciency in Northern Italy compared to the South is due to its more intense associational life. He claims that "associations instill in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public-spiritedness" (pp. 89-90). By contrast, Olsen (1982) argues that group activities can have an adverse e¤ect on economic growth because of their rent-seeking orientation. In an attempt to test and reconcile these opposing views, Knack and Keefer (1997) investigate the comparative economic e¤ect of distributive groups (such as parties, unions, and professional associations) and public-interest groups (such as cultural associations and youth groups) using the World Value Surveys. They …nd no evidence supporting the opposing e¤ect of "Putnamian" and "Olsonian" social forces on economic performance. In fact, they …nd that public-interest group activities tend to be negatively associated with economic growth. In this paper, the dependent variable is not an economic outcome such as growth rate or investment but a pro-development social attitude, namely preference for national public goods. Since such attitude is widely perceived as a precondition for economic success 1 , we claim that our results contribute to the social capital debate bad economic conditions such as falls in food production and crop ‡ood damage. They …nd that response in the form of public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure is higher wherever newspaper circulation is higher. Stromberg (2004) provides similar results in the US context, using data from the implementation of the New Deal Program in 1933-1935. Controlling for a host of relevant economic and demographic variables, he …nds that counties with radio listeners received more relief funds. Our results suggest that media outlets not only a¤ect the nature of the agency relationships between governments and voters, but can induce voters to have a stronger preference for national public goods. In fact, one may argue that access to media a¤ect accountability partly because it makes voters more public-spirited.
The remainder of the paper of is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide background information on Benin. Section 3 describes the experiment and introduces the data. Section 4 outlines the estimation method and presents the empirical results. The results are discussed in relation to the literature on social and political agency in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Background
The Republic of Benin (formerly Dahomey) is a former French colony, located in West Africa between Togo and Nigeria. Benin became independent in 1960 but the …rst twelve postindependence years were characterized by political instability with alternation of civilian and military rule. The country experienced its …fth and last military coup in 1972. The coup paved the way for a dictatorial regime led by Mathieu Kerekou, that lasted for 18 years. In February 1990, mass protests and economic pressure from France led the military regime to convene a national conference (a gathering of representatives from all of the political groups of that time) that gave birth to a new democratic government (Heilbrunn (1993) , Nwajiaku (1994) ).
The new constitution, written by the transitional government and approved by referendum, provided for a multiparty democracy. Since then, Benin has experienced three parliamentary and two presidential elections. 2 The president is elected through simple majority rule with run- 2 The country's …rst presidential election took place in 1991 and was won by Nicéphore Soglo, a former World Bank o¢ cial. The country had its second regular presidential contest on 3 March 1996 and Nicephore Soglo lost to Mathieu Kerekou, the former autocrat. Kerekou won again in March 2001 for what will be his last term in o¢ ce. o¤ elections. 3 Benin is considered one of the most successful cases of democratization in Africa.
Elections are meaningful and voters' policy preferences can be inferred from their behavior at the polls. Benin is perceived by many political scientists as the "democracy laboratory of Africa" because its political elite has the reputation to be open to political experiments. 4 The distribution of votes in presidential elections prior to 2001 was such that there was no risk that a …eld experiment would seriously a¤ect the outcome of the 2001 election. This is because (1) nationwide election outcomes had always revealed a signi…cant gap between the top two candidates (Kerekou and Soglo) and the remaining candidates and (2) electoral support for those top two candidates had always been between 27 to 37%. 5 As a result, a second round election posing Kerekou against Soglo in the 2001 presidential elections was a near certainty.
Benin has recorded a remarkable 4.9% average annual economic growth over the last 12 years (World Bank estimates). Despite this positive economic outlook, the GDP per-capita is only $430 and an estimated 65% of the population lives below the poverty line. Currently, only 50% of the population has access to drinking water and 18% to basic health care. The rate of schooling is 34% and the literacy rate is 29%. According to a World Bank report (1997), "achieving higher levels of economic growth and poverty reduction will require dramatic improvement in the e¤ectiveness of public service delivery through public expenditure reform, decentralization and reduced corruption". Yet the state payroll consumes between 65 and 90% of government budget. An estimated 50% of public services jobs are pure patronage redistribution and could be suppressed without a decline in the quality of public services (Decalo (1990) and The World Bank (1997)).
Experimental design and data
This paper identi…es the e¤ect of voting platforms on voting behavior using an experiment that exposed randomly selected villages to "purely"redistributive or clientelistic or "purely"na- 3 That is, if no candidate obtains a majority during the …rst round, a second round is organized for the top two candidates on the list and the plurality winner is elected. 4 For instance, the political leaders in Benin were the …rst to introduce the rotating presidency formula to curb ethnic strife in 1969. This formula was later adopted by leaders of the former Yugoslavia in 1980 following Tito's death. Benin also invented the national conference formula in 1989 as a way of facilitating a peaceful post-authoritarian transition (Boulaga [1993] ) 5 
Experimental design
To avoid a potential e¤ect on election results, the experiment was conducted by candidates only in their respective stronghold districts. An electoral district was de…ned as a party's stronghold if the party gained at least 70 percent of the votes in each of the previous presidential elections (1991 and 1996) . Using this de…nition, 21 out of the 24 electoral districts in Benin were classi…ed as strongholds of one party, while the other ones were classi…ed as competitive. Once the strongholds were identi…ed, two stronghold districts were randomly picked for each of the four parties participating in the experiment. For one candidate, La…a, the choice of districts was done slightly di¤erently. La…a did not participate in the previous presidential elections, but he participated in the 1999 legislative election. Based on the results of those elections, it appeared that two electoral districts were highly likely to turn out to be his strongholds, and hence these districts were selected to take part in the experiment. However, it turned out that in one of those districts, La…a was not the dominant candidate in the 2001 election, but that another candidate dominated. Since the experiment was meant to measure voters'response to changes in platforms by the dominant candidate, ex post this district did not qualify to be part of the sample. Table 1 summarizes the distribution of strongholds among the experimental candidates.
In each chosen district, two villages were randomly picked to take part in the experiment.
If the two villages were less than 20 kilometers apart, the second village was put back into the pool and another village was picked. Then a coin was ‡ipped to decide which one of the two villages would be in the public goods treatment group, and which one would be in the clientelistic treatment group. According to the 2001 census, the population consists of 6,633 registered voters in the redistributive/clientelistic treatment group, 6,983 voters in the public goods treatment group, and approximately 220,000 voters in the control group. For the purpose of the survey used in this paper, one village was randomly picked from the control group to be in the comparison group.
More formally, the experiment followed a randomized block design with treatments being assigned randomly to subunits (villages) within a number of randomly chosen units (electoral districts) in the population, which consists of all stronghold districts in Benin that are dominated by the four experimental candidates. Denote by N s the number of electoral districts controlled by candidate s 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g ; where candidate s is an experimental candidate. Then N = P N s is the total number of electoral districts involved in the experiment. Within each electoral district j, there are n j villages. The randomization process consists of the following four steps:
Step 1. Candidate s randomly draws 2 districts (say j and k) out of his N s stronghold districts.
Step 2. Candidate s randomly draws one village from the n j villages in district j and randomly draws one village from the n k villages in district k:
Step 3. Among the n j 1 remaining villages in district j and the n k 1 remaining villages in district k; remove from the pool those the villages that are contiguous or in the immediate vicinity of the village picked in stage 2. Then draw randomly one village from the remaining villages in districts j and k:
Step 4. Among the two villages in district j that were chosen in steps 2 and 3, ‡ip a coin to decide which one will be assigned to the redistributive treatment, and which one will be assigned to the public goods treatment. The remaining n j 2 villages in district j will serve as a comparison group. Repeat this procedure for district k.
The experiment thus involved 14 treatment villages in 7 districts, with the remaining villages in the corresponding districts serving as a comparison group. For the purpose of this paper, the survey also included one control village per district, randomly chosen in the pool of comparison villages. The strength of randomized evaluations rests on their ability to average out unobserved di¤erences between treatment and comparison groups. In this case, the small sample size poses a potential threat to the validity of this argument. To mitigate this problem,
we perform a series of robustness checks on the estimated treatment e¤ects by adding various control variables and …xed e¤ects to the regressions. In general, the coe¢ cient estimates are strikingly robust to the inclusion of these variables, raising our con…dence that the results are not due to an artifact of the small number of randomization units.
The treatments
While the treatment was meant to be as uniform as possible within the redistributive/clientelistic and public goods categories, four di¤erent parties with various party programs were implementing them. For this reason, the two types of messages were designed in active collaboration between the research team and the campaign managers of the parties, and they were based on the platforms that the parties had adopted independently of the experiment. A public goods message raised issues pertaining to poverty alleviation, public health and education reform, agricultural and industrial development. A distributive policy message, in contrast, took the form of a speci…c promise to the village, which could take the form of promised government patronage jobs for locals, local public goods such as establishing a new local university, …nan-cial support for local …shermen or cotton producers. By in large, a public good message and a distributive policy message stressed the same broad issues. However, the public goods message stressed the issue as part of a national programme, while the clientelistic message stressed the issue as a speci…c project to transfer government resources to the region or the village. In order to facilitate a clear distinction between the two types of messages and enhance the internal validity of the experiment, a public goods message never promised patronage jobs and a redistributive policy message never promised education reforms or vaccination campaigns. In addition, while campaign workers stressed the need for ethnic cooperation and harmony when they delivered the public goods messages, in the clientelistic messages they outlined the ethnic ties of the candidate with the local voters whenever it was possible. 6 For each experimental village, a team of campaign workers was formed by one or two party representatives and a research assistant, who doubled as a party worker for that election.
The teams then went ahead to do a typical election campaign in the experimental villages. In the control villages, parties sent out their regular teams. A typical election campaign in Benin goes as follows: During the three months before the elections, the campaign workers contact voters in their assigned villages. With the help of the local party leader, they …rst settle in the village, and then contact the local administration, religious or traditional authorities, and other local political actors. They make home visits to individuals known to be in ‡uential public …gures to deliver their campaign messages. These visits last about half an hour. In addition, they meet groups of 10 to 50 voters at sporting and cultural events, and organize public meetings of 50-100 people, which last approximately two hours.
In a redistributive platform experimental village, a typical policy meeting started with the following introduction by the campaign team:
"We are the representatives of the candidate (say) Saka, who is running for president in the upcoming election. As you know, Saka is running because our region lags behind in nearly all indices of economic development: literacy, infrastructure, health care, etc. If elected, he will help promote the interests of the region, by building new schools, hospitals, roads and more importantly, by hiring more people from the region in the public administration."
In contrast, a typical public meeting in a public goods experimental village started with the following introduction:
"We are representative of (say) Saka, our party stands for (say) democracy and equality. Candidate Saka is running as the opposition/incumbent candidate. If elected, he will engage in a nation-wide reform of the education and health care system placing an emphasis on building new schools, new hospitals and vaccination campaigns. In conjunction with other opposition leaders, we will …ght corruption and promote peace between all ethnic groups and all the regions of the country."
After the introductory statement, a discussion period ensued during which detailed explanations were provided on the relevant type of platform. Thus, a distributive policy message highlighted the candidate's ethnic a¢ liation, singled out the interests of the region, and promised pork barrel projects and patronage jobs. Meanwhile, a public goods message emphasized the candidate's a¢ liation to the incumbent or opposition coalition, and outlined a socioeconomic and political project for the country as a whole.
The experiment posed no real risks of Hawthorne or John Henry e¤ects, because it was fully embedded into the regular political campaigns. 7 Under normal circumstances, voters are subjected to parties' platforms, which are usually mixtures of redistributive and public goods messages on public health, education, etc... For the purpose of the experiment, the parties kindly o¤ered to "purify"their platforms in the treatment districts so that they would be either purely redistributive or purely public goods oriented. In other words, just like in any regular political campaign, the parties involved in the experiment were running on their own platforms.
The only di¤erence here is that they slightly adapted the campaigns that they intended to run in some villages to …t the objectives of the experiment, and because of this it is unlikely that voters were aware of the attention paid to them in the experiment.
A potential problem for the internal validity of the experiment is the di¤usion of nonexperimental messages by radio and television. Indeed during the elections there were 15 radio stations that covered about 80% of the country and two television stations covering about 75% of the country. There are several reasons to think that this is not a serious problem in this case.
First, radio and television time during elections, especially on national channels, are regulated so that candidates receive equal airtime. Since only four out of the 16 candidates participated in the elections, they would each have gotten only one sixteenth of the airtime available for election campaigns. Second, it is likely that radio and television messages would be of the public goods 7 Hawthorne e¤ects occur when experimental subjects change their behavior because they are being observed by the experimenters (E. Mayo [1933] ). John Henry e¤ects occur when control groups try to "catch up" with treatment groups to compensate their "lack of luck" in the randomization of treatment.(E. Mayo [1933]) type, since it is hard to target particular villages using these media. Third, the most dominant form of political communication in Benin is canvassing, large meetings and rallies. 8 Finally, since radio and TV messages were broadcast in all villages, both control and treatment groups would have been equally a¤ected by them, reducing the likelihood that they introduced a bias in the estimate of the treatment e¤ect.
Data
The voting and socioeconomic and information network data were gathered during a 1996 and 1991 presidential elections. Respondents were also asked to rank the candidates in the 2001 presidential elections. However, because the survey took place more than one year after the elections, it is likely that respondents' preferences would have changed since the election, both due to the announcement of the election results and to respondents' perception of the candidates'performances after the election. For this reason, we only use respondents'reported voting in the analysis. Table 2 presents the summary statistics. The table presents mean values of the variables for the treatment groups and the control group. We test the di¤erence between each treatment group and the control group using a linear regression with clustered standard errors at the village level, and …nd that the treatment groups are similar on nearly all dimensions to the control group. The mean education level is higher in the treatment groups than in the control group, especially in the public goods group. However, the di¤erence is only signi…cant for the public goods group, at the 10 percent level.
Estimation and empirical results

Estimation method
We estimate the e¤ects of the public goods and clientelistic treatments on voting behavior using the following probit model:
where Y ij is a categorical variable that takes value 1 if individual j in village i votes for the experimentalist candidate, and 0 otherwise; x ij is the vector of individual characteristics for individual j in village i, and T i is the categorical variable for treatment in village i: The sampling follows a three-stage cluster sampling design: 7 districts were randomly chosen in a strati…ed way from the sampling frame, the set of stronghold districts of the 4 experimental candidates. Within each district, 2 villages were randomly chosen, and within the villages 35 Since not all candidates had the same number of strongholds, and not all strongholds had identical numbers of villages, it results that di¤erent villages within the sampling frame had di¤erent probabilities of being sampled to take part in the experiment. The probability of sampling a village v in candidate k's stronghold s is
where N k is the number of strongholds controlled by candidate k that participated in the experiment, S k is the number of strongholds controlled by candidate k, V sk is the number of villages in candidate k 's stronghold s. For the sample to be representative, the observations must be weighted to account for di¤erent sampling weights. However, since we are dealing with a small number of villages, using the sampling weights can substantially lower the precision of our estimates. For this reason, we run both weighted and unweighted regressions, and show that the results are not signi…cantly di¤erent.
The dependent variable is a categorical variable that takes value 1 if the respondent voted for the experimentalist candidate, and value zero otherwise. Because in all villages, the experimentalist was also the dominant candidate, we will interchangeably use the terms experimentalist candidate and dominant candidate. Because the dominant candidate commands at least 70 percent of the votes, while the remaining 15 candidates share the rest, the strategic behavior of the other candidates is unlikely to have a substantial e¤ect on voting outcomes.
When estimating the e¤ect of the public goods treatment, the sample always consists of all respondents in the public goods treatment villages and all respondents in the control villages. The sample used for estimating the e¤ect of the clientelistic treatment consists of the respondents in the clientelistic treatment villages and in the control villages. Since a substantial number of regressors are categorical variables, we calculate and report the mean marginal e¤ects of the regressors rather than the marginal e¤ects at the mean of the independent variables.
In the analysis, we investigate the modifying e¤ect of voter characteristics on their response to the experimental platforms. The …rst set of results relates voter response to a¢ liation in various social and information networks. The data provide various measures of respondents' a¢ liations in social and information networks. Not surprisingly, these variables are substantially correlated. This implies that including all of them in a regression would lead to nearmulticollinearity and low estimation precision. For this reason, we use principal components analysis to construct indices for respondent's participation in social networks and use of media outlets. In the …rst instance, we divide the variables into two categories: one for "local" networks and one for "broader" networks. This re ‡ects the key distinction between the two treatments: the local focus of the clientelistic treatment and the national, broad focus of the public goods treatment. The variables included in the local networks category are membership in local organizations and political discussions at home, in the village and outside the village.
The broader network variables are usage of radio, television and newspapers or magazines as a source of information, travel frequency, the number of languages spoken and long-distance family relations. We use principal components analysis to construct a variable with maximum variance out of these primary variables. Table 3 reports the results of the principal components analysis.
In each category, the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition suggests that one factor accounts for most of the variation. Two variables -membership in a cooperative and the categorical variable for having a child outside the village-appeared to have negative and near-zero factor loadings when included in the principal components analysis, and for this reason we excluded them from the construction of the composite variables.
The second set of results relates response to the experimental platforms to gender, ethnic group, education levels, economic status, marital status, and religion. Of these covariates, socioeconomic status is by far the hardest one to measure. Over 60 percent of respondents report being farmers, and only 2.6 percent are formally employed. It is a well known issue that surveys on income in such circumstances do not adequately represent household socioeconomic status, and that consumption surveys are preferable. For a variety of reasons, it was not possible to collect consumption data in the survey. However, the survey collected basic indicators of the respondents'housing quality, like the availability of tap water, brick walls (as opposed to mud walls), tile and cement ‡oors (as opposed to mud ‡oors) and electricity in the homestead. We use principal components analysis again to compute an index of housing quality. (Table 4 ) Finally, the data contain a self-reported assessment of respondents'income stability, and whether they are involved in commercial activities, which we use to perform some robustness checks. Table 5 reports the …rst set of main results. Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the results from the public goods experiment, while columns 4, 5 and 6 report the results from the clientelistic experiment. The estimations reported in columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 include …xed e¤ects for the dominant candidate, while the estimations reported in columns 3 and 6 also use village sampling weights. The standard errors are clustered at the village level. By and large, the public goods treatment leads to a signi…cant decrease in the probability of voting for the experimentalist, and even more so for men. (Table 5 , Column 1) The e¤ect of the clientelistic treatment is negative but non-signi…cant. (Column 4) The magnitude of the e¤ect of the public goods treatment is very substantial at 25 percent. We …nd that voters with more broad social connections and voters with more education react less negatively to the public goods message. One standard deviation increase in the measure of broad social networks is associated with a 6.4 to 12.7 9 percent increase in the probability to vote for the experimentalist candidate in the public goods experiment.
Basic results
(Columns 1 and 3) By contrast, we …nd that respondents with more local social connections react more negatively to the public goods message. However, this is only statistically signi…cant in the regression that includes candidate …xed e¤ects. (Columns 2 and 3) One standard deviation increase in the local networks measure (1.42) is associated with a 5.7 to 7.1 percent decrease in the probability of voting for the experimentalist candidate in the public goods experiment.
(Columns 1 and 3) We …nd no interaction e¤ect between treatment and local or broad networks in the clientelistic experiment. As for the level e¤ects, we …nd that voters who are broadly connected are less likely to vote for the dominant candidate. In the local connections case, the association with voting for the dominant candidate is either statistically insigni…cant or small compared to the other estimated e¤ects.
One may wonder whether broad connections are just an artifact of the education level and economic status of a voter. In order words, the more educated is a voter, the more likely she is to be broadly connected, or vice versa. For this reason, we control for voters' level of education and interact their education level with the treatment variable, and we also control for voters'housing quality. We …nd that education has a substantial level e¤ect: for example, a shift from no education to primary education decreases the probability to vote for the dominant candidate between 5 and 9 percentage points. As for the interaction e¤ect with treatment, we …nd that voters with primary education are 5 to 7 percentage points more likely to vote for the experimentalist candidate in the public goods experiment that voters with no education. There is no such interaction e¤ect in the clientelistic experiment.
We do not …nd any correlation between the housing quality indicator and voting behavior.
This suggests that either di¤erences in social status were not large enough within the sample to generate di¤erences in political behavior, that the housing quality indicator is not a satisfactory proxy for socio-economic status, or that there is no political di¤erentiation along social status.
There are indications that the …rst explanation -low levels of inequality in the areas where the experiment took place -is relevant. Benin has one of the lowest inequality levels in Africa, and rural inequality is signi…cantly lower than urban inequality. The 2001 Gini coe¢ cient for per capita consumption in rural areas is 0.30, about the level of Nordic countries. (Table 6) One important component of social networks in Africa is ethnic ties. An ethnic group is usually de…ned as a group of people who are identi…ed on the basis of cultural or biological similarities or both. The conventional wisdom in political science is that ethnic ties are strong predictors of voting behavior. In this paper, we construct an indicator of whether the experimentalist candidate and the voter are from the same ethnic group 10 , and use this indicator as an exogenous variable in the regressions. As reported in Columns 1 and 3, respondents with ethnic ties to the candidate react 15 percentage points more positively to the public goods message.
Once again, there is no corresponding …nding in the clientelistic experiment. The level e¤ect of ethnic ties on voting behavior is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. That is, voters from the same ethnic group as the dominant candidate are not any more or less likely to vote for that candidate than those who are not. This means that ethnic ties matter for voting behavior only when the message is universalistic or public goods-type.
Finally, the clientelist treatment generates no signi…cant changes in voting behavior. A joint test for the impact of clientelistic treatment reveals that there is no evidence of an overall treatment e¤ect. (Table 5 , Column 2) There are two potential explanations for this result. First, it might be that a clientelistic message triggers no changes in voting behavior compared to the standard message. Second and more likely, it might be that the clientelistic message is not very di¤erent from the standard message adopted by parties, and which was used in the control villages.
Disaggregating social networks
In the second step of the analysis, we classify the social network variables into smaller categories. Using the principal components approach, we construct one variable that synthesizes memberships in local organizations, one variable for political discussions, one variable for use of media outlets and one variable for travel, languages spoken and a long-distance family relations.
The construction of these variables is reported in Table 7 . Table 8 reports the second set of main results. As before, columns 1 and 3 report the results from the public goods experiment, while columns 2 and 4 report the results from the clientelistic experiment. The regressions reported in columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 contain candidate …xed e¤ects, while those in columns 3 and 6 also use sample weights.
We …nd that use of media is what drove the positive interaction between broad social networks and the public goods treatment: Respondents who use media outlets more react less negatively to the public goods treatment, but travel and language skills do not a¤ect respondents'reactions. The interaction e¤ect between use of media and treatment is sizeable: a one standard deviation increase in use of media (1.15) is associated with 8 to 11.5 percentage points higher responsiveness to public goods treatment. Strikingly, use of media has a strong negative association with the probability of voting for the dominant candidate.
Membership in organizations and political discussions have opposite interaction e¤ects with the public goods treatment. Respondents who are members of parties, unions or NGOs react The estimation method is Probit. The reported estimates are mean marginal e¤ects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and are reported in parentheses. * signi…cant at 10 percent; ** signi…cant at 5 percent; *** signi…cant at 1percent more positively to the public goods message: a one standard deviation increase in membership is associated with 6.8 to 10.2 percentage points higher responsiveness to public goods treatment.
By contrast, a one standard deviation increase in the discussions measure is associated with 6.8 to 10.2 percentage points lower responsiveness to this treatment. Interestingly, the level e¤ects of political discussions show that increased participation in political discussions is associated with higher probability to vote for the dominant candidate.
The coe¢ cient estimates on education, ethnic ties, gender and housing quality, and their interactions with the treatment variable are robust to the changes in the categorization of networking and information variables. In addition, the coe¢ cient estimates are quite robust to the addition of candidate …xed e¤ects. The stability of the estimates to the inclusion of villagelevel controls alleviates concerns that the small sample size might not appropriately balance unobservable village characteristics.
Further results: socioeconomic status and religious a¢ liation
As with education, the modifying e¤ect of social and information networks on voting behavior might be an artifact of di¤erential socioeconomic status. For this reason, the basic analysis controls for housing quality, a proxy for socio-economic status. The preliminary results from that analysis suggest no signi…cant e¤ect from housing quality. In this section, we con…rm the robustness of this …nding by using additional measures of socioeconomic status. We construct an indicator of whether a respondent is involved in a commercial activity with a capital of over CFA 50,000, approximately USD 90. Table 9 , columns 1 to 3 report estimates for the public goods experiment using various speci…cations. As before, the addition of socioeconomic Religious a¢ liation is a competing explanation for our …nding on the role of ethnic ties on voters' response to the public goods treatment. The three main religious groups in Benin, Christians, Muslims and Animists, are almost equally represented in the sample, while three out of four candidates in the sample are Christians. When controlling for respondents'religious a¢ liation, we …nd no change in the coe¢ cient estimate of the interaction between ethnic ties and treatment or in its statistical signi…cance. This indicates that ethnic a¢ liation is far more politically salient than religious a¢ liation. In addition, there is no signi…cant change in the other coe¢ cient estimates. This is an important robustness check because Muslims are less likely to participate in political discussions or local associations. The stability of the coe¢ cients on local networks and their interactions with treatment con…rm that the results are not merely picking up di¤erences in religious a¢ liation.
5 Discussion and relation to the literature
Media
Our …rst main …nding is that voters'preferences for public goods di¤er when their have di¤erent access to media. This could be explained in several ways. It is worthwhile to keep in mind that the messages conveyed on television, on the radio, and in newspapers and magazines are largely national in nature. Therefore, voters who listen to the radio or television, and voters who read newspapers and magazines may have a better sense or knowledge of the problems of the country as a whole and might be more receptive to a public goods message. In addition, listening to the radio, watching television or reading the newspapers might foster a sense of community among listeners and readers, which would make them more attentive to the needs of fellow community members. Alternatively, access to media strengthens voters'ability to monitor the implementation of platforms. Since the implementation of national platforms is inherently more di¢ cult to monitor than for redistributive platforms, it is clear that media access will age 20 or younger, while 70 percent are younger than 25. Since so few women in the sample are unmarried and most of those are clustered in the age group 18 to 20, sample sizes would be inadequate to analyse women's voting behavior by marital status. We select the sample of men age 18 to 40 and analyse their voting reaction to the public goods platforms by marital status. Approximetely 46 percent of men in this sample are single.While single men are less likely to vote for the dominant candidate than married men, the two groups are similar reactions to the public goods treatment.
strengthen support for national platforms.
Our …ndings di¤er from the ones in Stromberg (2004) and Besley and Burgess (2000) , who emphasizes the role of radio as an information device that facilitates monitoring given voters' preferences. Stromberg (2004) …nds that the expansion of radio in the 1930's in the US led to a substantial increase in the provision of public goods, presumably because radio listeners were better aware of policies that a¤ected them and had better information to monitor their political representatives. Besley and Burgess (2000) …nd that, given citizens'preferences, media make governments more responsive to citizens' needs. By contrast to these papers, we document how people's preferences di¤er when their access to the media varies. Second, we use disaggregated data at the voter level rather than data that are spatially aggregated.
Membership
Our second main …nding relates to voters' membership in parties, unions and NGOs.
We …nd that members of such organizations react less negatively to public goods messages than non-members. Again, there are several possible explanations for this. First, organization membership connects people to a regional or national community, which might lead to more knowledge about the needs of the country as a whole. Second, membership might be correlated with entrepreneurship, which itself might be correlated with a higher expected spatial mobility, which would lead to higher demand for national public goods. Third, members of a party might trust their political leadership more than other people, and hence they might be more responsive to their leader's message, regardless of the content of the message, a "follow-theleader"interpretation. This is di¤erent from Olson (1982)'s story, who argues that membership in organizations leads to higher demand for clientelism, as organizations exploit their power to extract rents through policies that bene…t them when their opposition is spread and not organized. As we mentioned earlier, this is in line with Putnam (1993) 's story of a relationship between organizational membership and better governance and economic performance. Narayan and Pritchett (1999) analyze the relationship between membership in associations and income in rural villages in Tanzania. In the OLS analysis, they …nd a positive and signi…cant correlation between the two measures. In an attempt to identify the causal e¤ect of memberships on income, they use trust as an instrumental variable for memberships, and …nd a signi…cantly larger coe¢ cient estimate, suggesting measurement error in their variable for memberships. We …nd no positive association between memberships and assets in our data.
Political Discussions
The third main …nding of the paper is a positive correlation between local political discussions and the probability to vote for the dominant candidate. The …rst explanation for this …nding is that discussions are an artifact of political support for the dominant candidate. If people prefer talking politics to others with the same political preferences, then people supporting the dominant candidate have more preferred discussion partners, and hence will talk politics more often. In addition, if there is a danger of being isolated or ostracized when voicing non-dominant political preferences, then people supporting a non-dominant candidate will talk politics less often.
Another possible explanation for the link between political discussions and voting for the dominant candidate comes from the concept of distance. The discussion variable might capture the geographic distance between households under the assumption that shorter distances lead to more human interactions, inter alia political discussions. On the other hand, shorter geographic distance might also lead to voting externalities because it facilitates e¤ective transmission of information about voting behavior. The availability of information about voting behavior would in turn make possible social sanctions against community members for deviant voting. In short, geographic distance can be correlated with both political discussions and voting externalities, leading to a correlation between political discussions and voting behavior in the regressions.
Since we do not have measures of geographic distance between households, it is not possible to assess whether this story is a plausible explanation for the …ndings.
There is a third potential explanation for why voters who discuss politics at the local level react more negatively to public goods treatment. While political discussion might create a community, this would be a local community without connection to outside communities. This makes it di¤erent from memberships in organizations or media usage. Local discussions without link to the outside world reinforce local bonding and demands for redistribution towards the locality.
Ethnic ties
The fourth main …nding of the paper is that ethnic a¢ liates react less negatively to public goods messages. This con…rms earlier results discussed in Wantchekon (2003) . There are three possible explanations for this result. The …rst explanation is self-interest: Co-ethnic voters are supportive of a national public goods program because they believe even such a program will bene…t them more than voters from other groups given that the candidate belongs to their ethnic group. The second explanation is signalling of the"only Nixon can go to China"kind. The value of broad based platforms is enhanced when they emanate from an unlikely but trusted source, in this case the ethnic candidate. The third explanation is credibility of political messages:
It is more di¢ cult for voters to monitor the implementation of broad national platforms than redistributive platforms, which typically include patronage jobs and local public goods. Non ethnic a¢ liates are less likely to favor broad-based appeals than ethnic a¢ liates because they cannot use the social pressures that ethnic ties provide to hold politicians accountable. Hence ethnic ties enhance voters'ability to monitor politician behavior, the same way that media access does. 12 This study contributes to the current debate on ethnicity and public goods provision.
Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) present evidence indicating that ethnic divisions increase the demand for redistribution and adversely a¤ect levels of public of goods in Africa and in several US cities. They argue that ethnic diversity re ‡ects heterogeneity in preferences for public goods, and that increased diversity leads to lower contributions to, and hence lower supply of public goods. An alternative explanation for the low supply of national public goods in the presence of ethnic diversity is the Olsonian rent-seeking argument. For example, Bates (1983) argues that ethnic ties and spatial concentration of ethnic groups make it easier for citizens to lobby for projects of regional interest. For Fearon and Laitin (1996) and Fearon (1999), a greater level of interaction may increase trust among co-ethnics and facilitate coalition building along ethnic lines, which make lobbying more e¤ective. Assuming that higher demand for national public goods implies lower demand for redistribution, the evidence presented here contradicts this …nding and indicates that ethnic solidarity can increase the demand for public goods.
Gender
The stronger preference of women for public goods platforms con…rms the robustness of earlier results presented in Wantchekon (2003) . In that paper, two potential explanations were provided. The …rst points to the fact that women are excluded from the most common forms of redistribution and are more responsive to platforms stressing public health or education reforms. The second explanation focused on occupational choice. Fafchamps and Gabre-Madhin (2001) …nd that while men dominate agricultural production in Benin, 80% of inter-regional agricultural product traders in the country are women. They …nd that a signi…cant proportion of traders travel weekly to other regions of the country and speak several languages. If women dominate trade in general, one might think that women tend to be better informed about social and economic conditions in the country than men, and could, for that reason, value broad-based public policies. In our data, we …nd no evidence that trade in general, as opposed to agricultural trade, is dominated by women, that women travel more, or that they speak more languages than men. For example, 44 percent of traders in our sample are men, and the average number of languages spoken is 1.35 for women, and 1.6 for men. Hence it appears that the results in Fafchamps and Gabre-Madhin (2001) are largely driven by their sampling frame.
Conclusions
An unusual political experiment in 2001 presidential elections in Benin provided a unique opportunity to investigate the extent to which information and civic community a¤ect voters' responsiveness to national public goods platforms. While participation in broader information networks is associated with stronger preference for national public goods, participation in local social networks is associated with higher demand for those who are members of political organizations, and lower demand for those involved in political discussions. Our results provide micro-evidence that supports both the Putnam thesis on the positive role for social capital in the process of economic development, and the Olson thesis on the rent-seeking drift of organiza-tions. In addition, our results suggest that public access to information and use of media outlets may not only make governments more responsive, but also shape voters' demand for growth promoting policies. Paradoxically, ethnic ties between voters and candidates can increase the demand for national public goods. Thus ethnic ties and media access have similar e¤ects, arguably because they both enhance voters'ability to monitor politicians. We con…rm the …nding in Wantchekon (2003) that women are more favorable to public goods platforms, and show that this cannot be explained by education levels, occupation, or spacial mobility levels. We …nd no evidence that religion or assets in ‡uence voting patterns after controlling for gender, ethnic ties, education and memberships in social networks.
One of the question arising from the present paper is what the treatment e¤ect would have been, has the experiment took place in competitive districts as opposed to non-competitive districts. For instance, would ethnic a¢ liates of the dominant candidate remained as responsive to public goods treatment in more competitive and hence ethnic diverse districts? We intend to address this question in future research.
Another limitation of the current experiment is the fact that experimental platforms were framed either narrowly or broadly, and lacked speci…c policy content. This contrasts with most impact evaluations work which pays no attention to politics and to political processes. This clearly limits the extent to which successful interventions can be brought to scale, in contexts where politicians are unsure about the electoral consequences of advocating those policies. The next step will be to integrate these two approaches in order to assess the impact of speci…c policy proposals on electoral responses. Rather than being technical proposals for government bureaucrats, proven policy reforms could become part of the public domain, and become the basis of substantial debate in election times. Evaluating the technical aspect of passing an economically e¢ cient policy through the political process, to …nd policies that pass two tests: economic e¢ ciency and political economy considerations.
